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PROPER SUBJECTS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
AD HOC V. PREDICTIVE DEFINITION:
Tn extent to which collective bargaining can increase in scope maylargely
depend on the legal protection it receives. 1 If the protected area is clearly
limited by the courts to that existing in current industrial practice, the ex-
pansion may be slowed. But to the extent that the area is left undefined,
legal precedent may follow industry practice into new fields.
Until recently, the phrase of the Wagner Act which defines proper sub-
jects for collective bargaining had not been avowedly construed. Instead
of looking to the words of the statute-"rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other conditions of employment" '-and ascertaining Con-
gressional intent from the legislative history, the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts had used extrinsic criteria to define the scope of man-
datory bargaining, or had used none at all.
Without express interpretation of the Act, a wide variety of subjects had
been held proper. Included under "rates of pay" and "wages," were such
items as bonuses,3 paid vacations and holidays, 4 and individual wage in-
creases based on meritfi Such diverse subjects as personnel transfers and
promotions,6 plant rules,7 and the closed shop" were explicitly held to be
"other conditions of employment," while seniority' and the company's
system of subcontracting work 10 were among the many subjects embraced
* Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
1. Quite distinct, and beyond the scope of this Note, is the legal protection afforded
a union when it resorts to its economic weapons of strike or boycott in order to achieve
its demands after the collective bargaining process has resulted in an impasse. See, gen-
erally, TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLncv BARGAINING cc. 7-9, 14, 20 (1940).
2. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159(a) (1940), unchanged in this respect
by the Taft-Hartley amendment, 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159(a) (Supp.
1948).
3. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 67 N. L. R. B. 627, 631-2 (1946).
4. Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N. L. R. B. 444, 470 (1940), enforced as inodified, 119 F2d
131 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 595 (1941).
5. NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denicd, 335
U. S. 814 (1948).
Apparently also in reliance on the words "rates of pay, wages," severance pay and
pay to sick employees were held proper subjects in NLRB v. Knoxville Publishing Co.,
124 F.2d 875, 882 (6th Cir. 1942).
6. U. S. Automatic Corp., 57 N. L. R. B. 124, 133-4 (1944).
7. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N. L. R. B. 500, 502 (1946), enforccmcnt den fed
on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
S. Carroll's Transfer Co., 56 N. L. R. B. 935, 937 (1944). The closed shop is now
prohibited, however, by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 158(a) (3) (Supp. 1948).
9. Dallas Cartage Co., 14 N. L. R. B. 411, 418, 430 (1939).
10. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N. L. R. B. 500, 518 (1946), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
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by implication in this phrase."
Only two subjects had been declared improper: the discharge of a super-
visor, 12 and a union demand that the company cooperate to secure legisla-
tion favorable to the industry. 3
Despite this conglomeration of decisions, the statute had not received
full-dress construction until recently, perhaps because the appropriateness
of a subject had usually been a subordinate issue in the cases. 4 Most of the
opinions had merely asserted that the subject in question was proper, 1" and
11. The decision technique of including subjects under "other conditions of employ-
ment!' by implication is a common one. E.g., Inter-City Advertising Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 1377,
1384, 1385-6 (1945), enforcement denied on other grounds, 154 F.2d 244 (4th Cir, 1946)
(changing work schedules); Washougal Woolen Mills, 23 N. L. R. B. 1, 10 (1940)
(reinstatement of former employees); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th
Cir. 1945) (grievance procedure) ; General Motors Corp., 59 N. L. R. B. 1143, 1145,
1153 (1944), enforced as modified, 150 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1945) (changing from salary
to hourly pay basis); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N. L, R. B. 500, 521 (1946),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947) (providing spell hands
for workers, and the number of employees in a mill) ; Hagy, Harrington & Marsh, 74
N. L. R. B. 1455, 1471 (1947) (future re-employment of laid-off employees); Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 37 N. L. R. B. 100, 108-9, 124-5 (1941), enforced, 133 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1943) (arbitration); Andrew Jergens Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 363, 365 (1948)
(union security).
The size and composition of the shop committee was held a proper subject in Clay-
ton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 34 N. L. R. B. 502, 524 (1941), criticized in Note, 51 YALLg
L. J. 496 (1942). But this decision appears to have been overruled insofar as it made
limitation of the group from whom employees may choose their representatives a bar-
gainable issue. The Oliver Corp., 74 N. L. R. B. 483, 486 and n.6 (1947).
In NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 342 (1939), the Supreme Court ruled
that it was an employer's duty to bargain about interpretation and modification of the
collective agreement. But the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(d) (Supp. 1948), now requires neither party to bargain about modification of the
agreement while it is in force. See Cox, Sonte Aspects of the Labor Management Rela.
tions Act, 1947, 61 H~Av. L. REv. 1, 274, 278 (1947-8).
12. NLRB v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 125 F.2d 377, 390 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. dcded,
316 U. S. 706 (1942).
The court in Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1945) appears to
have ruled that the checkoff is not a proper subject. But this seems an aberrational
holding. The decision apparently meant that the Act did not prevent an employer from
checking off dues for a minority union, but it did not mean that an employer had Ito
duty to bargain about a union demand that a checkoff provision be included in the
contract.
13. Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
14. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co., supra, note 10, where the circuit court held that
a company was not required to bargain about a union demand while it was being
processed under the grievance procedure.
The first decision in which the appropriateness of a subject for collective bargaining
was a central issue was National Labor Relations Board v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F,2d
766 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 814 (1948). The holding, however, did not
interpret the statute directly, nor did it add to existing bases for decision.
15. E. g., NLRB v. Sand Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 342 (1939), where the Supreme
Court assumed that the interpretation and modification of a contract are proper subjects;
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the remainder had held the subject proper if it was "normally" the subject
of collective bargaining,16 or if it "vitally affected" the interests of the
employees.'7 Since these amorphous criteria afforded virtually no basis for
predicting whether a new demand would be called a proper subject, each
decision had been ad hoc, and the mere addition of new subjects to the list
failed to produce any increasingly precise interpretation of the Act.
In Inland Steel Co. v. Aiational Labor Relations B3oard,'3 however, the
statute was expressly interpreted and the precedent examined. In sustain-
ing the Board's decision that a pension and retirement plan is a proper
subject for bargaining, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
plan was "wages" by construing that term to mean all "emoluments of
value . . .which may accrue to employees out of their employment rela-
tionship."' 9 Second, it found the plan to be included in "conditions of em-
ployment" by giving that phrase a broader meaning than mere "working
conditions." 20 The court then employed the usual ad hoc technique, com-
paring the plan with other subjects already declared proper, and reasoning
that no operative distinction could be drawn between them.
2-
The significance of this decision is less that it called pension plans proper
subjects, 22 than that it may have started the development of an interpre-
tation of the statute that would define the area of mandatory bargaining.
While one of the grounds for decision was the similarity between the plan
and other proper subjects, and while the decision might have been made on
that ground alone, the main reliance of the court was on its own express
interpretation of the Act. Although this interpretation was in no way re-
strictive,23 growth of the definitive method of decision, in contrast to the
ad hoc technique heretofore employed, may restrict expansion of the pro-
tected area of collective bargaining.
To the extent that this method of decision increases predictability, it
NLRB v. Knoxville Publishing Co., 124 F.2d 875, 8.2 (6th Cir. 1942), where severance
pay, paid vacations, and pay to sick employees were tacitly assumed to be proper subjects,
since a refusal to embody existing company practices concerning them into a written
agreement was held to be a refusal to bargain as to "rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ploy nent, and other conditions of employment."
16. E. g., Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N. L. R. B. 444, 470 (1940), enforced as aodificd,
119 F2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denicd, 313 U. S. 595 (1941).
17. E. g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. XLRB, 70 N. L. . B. 500, 518 (1946),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
18. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
19. Id. at 250-1.
20. Id. at 251, 255.
21. Id. at 252-3.
22. For a discussion of pension plans as a proper subject in the light of the instant
case, see Note, 43 Im-. L. REV. 713 (1943).
23. The court went so far as to say: "We do not believe that it was contemplated that
the language ['rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of em-
ployment'] was to remain static." Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, spra, note 1, at 254.
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decreases administrative flexibility in dealing with new problems. Yet there
is no evidence in the legislative history of the Act to indicate Congressional
intent to define the area of mandatory bargaining in any greater degree
than do the broad words of the statute. 24 It may therefore be inferred that
Congress, perhaps feeling unable to foresee the demands that unions might
make and the pattern of union-management relationships that might
evolve, intended the Board to make its decisions without being burdened by
specific limitations. Subsequent Congresses have apparently desired to retain
that flexibility, for despite repeated attempts to persuade them to detail
proper subjects for bargaining, they have declined to do so. 26 The same
considerations are probably present in the Board's unwillingness to promul-
gate an inclusive definition, and the courts, removed one step further from
the facts and lacking the expert knowledge of the Board, have been even
less willing to make the attempt."
Nevertheless, disagreement over the desirability of a predictive definition
is so strong that it was the primary reason for the failure of the President's
Labor-Management Conference in 1945.Y Conflict focuses principally on
the effect of such a definition on expansion of collective bargaining rather
than on the value of predictability as such. Neither management nor labor
is greatly prejudiced merely by lack of predictability, since a wrong guess
will entail no loss. When in doubt, the union will probably assume that the
subject is proper, and will file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board
if the employer refuses to bargain.28 If the Board decides that the subject
24. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, mipra, note 18, at 254; Sm. PXP. No. 573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935) ; H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935).
25. Several bills which attempted to limit the area of proper subjects have been
amended to strike out the limiting provision, or have died in committee, e. g., H. R. 5218,
H. R. 5259, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) (attempts to define an area of exclusive manage-
ment control); see CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANA= rENT CONTROL
152 (1948); S. 1171, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23 (1945) (same); see TELLER, MANAGE-
MENT FuNcTIoNs UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 188 (1947) ; H. R. 3020, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1947) (attempt to list proper subjects) ; see H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22-3, 49, 71 (1947); 93 CoNG. REc. 3548 (1947).
26. See Note, SEC v. Chenery Corp.: A Case Study in Administrative Technique,
62 HARv. L. REv. 478 (1949) for the factors involved in a choice between rule-making
and adjudication as methods of administration. Although the NLRB is denied this
choice by its lack of rule-making power, similar factors are involved in choosing between
ad hoc and predictive adjudication.
27. See TEL.ER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 14, 15, 99-104 (1947).
In its separate report, the management members submitted a list of subjects upon
which, in their opinion, bargaining ought to be required. At the end of this list was "and
such other matters as may be mutually agreed upon." 3 PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL LADOR-
MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 50 (1945). This suggests a solution to the problem inter-
mediate between a holding that a subject is proper and that it is improper. The NLRB
could leave it to the parties themselves to determine the appropriateness of a subject by
requiring them to bargain about whether a doubtful union demand is a proper subject. To
date, however, this solution has not been adopted by the Board.
28. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the rep-
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is improper, the union will not even have lost attorney's fees, since the pros-
ecution is undertaken by Government counsel.2 Management, on the other
hand, will assume that doubtful demands are not proper subjects, and will
refuse to bargain. If the Board holds that the subject is proper, the company
will merely be ordered to cease and desist from refusing to bargain, and no
penalty will attach unless the company violates the order twice thereafter.-3
The main disagreement between management and labor concerns the pos-
sibility of limiting the area of legally protected collective bargaining. Fear-
ing continued expansion, management favors a predictive definition of
proper subjects since it might fix a limit beyond which the protection of the
Act would be denied to unions." LikeNise foreseeing extension of its de-
mands, labor opposes clear delimitation of the area of mandatory bargain-
ing. The unions feel that definition now would be in the light of current
practices, whereas decision made on an ad hoc basis will leave the process
of definition flexible until opinion becomes accustomed to union participa-
tion in company decisions now regarded as within the prerogative of man-
agement.3 2 Although in the Inland Steel case the predictive method of de-
representative of his employees. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 5) (1940), as
amended, 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. S 158(a) (5) (Supp. 194S). The charge
may be brought by any person or labor organization. 29 Cor- Fun. Rr.s. §2022
(Supp. 1947).
29. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(b) (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 146-7
(1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(b) (Supp. 1948). See Wolf, Administrathv Procedure Be-
fore the National Labor Relations Board, 5 U. CnL L. REv. 35, 369, 371 (1938).
30. Upon finding that a person has committed an unfair labor practice, the Board is-
sues a cease and desist order. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) (1940), as
amended, 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(c) (Supp. 1948). If the order is not
complied with, the Board may petition for court enforcement. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29
U. S. C. § 160(e) (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 147-8 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(e)
(Supp. 1948). The third violation becomes contempt of court. See Wolf, Adniristrali'vo
Procedure Before the National Labor Relations Board, 5 U. CHL L rv. 358, 3S0-1
(1938).
If the employer wishes to argue that the subject is improper, he must, of course, mahe
the necessary expenditures. Public counsel is not provided to defend either company or
union against unfair labor practice charges. Cf. note 32 infra.
31. CHAmDERLAN, THE UIoN CHA.utNcE To MAIAGraIxT CO:;TfrOL 129-42
(1948) ; 3 PazsmExrs NAT omL LABor-MANAGraS=NT COnFnoEnEc 47-50 (1945).
32. CHA= RLAm , op. cit. supra note 31, at 142-7; 3 Pnesmz:Fs NATio:-A. L=ri-
MANAGEmEN CoxnF-anEc 43-6 (1945).
The provision of the Taft-Hartley Act requiring unions to bargain raises the possibility
that there may be some subjects the union regards as being solely within its prerogative,
which management would like to bargain about. To date, however, this possibility has not
materialized. Moreover, it is unlikely to assume very great importance, since the statutory
prohibition against interference by management in the rights of the employees to organize
and select their representatives precludes bargaining on those subjects regarded by the
unions as vital to their independent existence. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 158(b) (3) (Supp. 1948); 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158, as amended, 61 STAT.
140 (1947) ; 29 U. S. C. A. § 158(a) (Supp. 1948).
For an example of a case in which the Board apparently went a little too far into the
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cision resulted in so broad a definition of proper subjects that it strengthened
the union position, courts less sympathetic to labor's views may employ
the same method to restrict the legally protected area of collective bargain-
ing. 3
3
protected area and permitted an employer to make demands which appeared to be an in-
terference with his employees' rights, see Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., note 11 .upra.
33. For the effect of the protection of the Act on labor's ability to extend its participa-
tion in management, see CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. mtpra note 31, c.8.
